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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANNA LEE ANDERSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., 
a foreign corporation, 
RALPH PAHNKE and 
JOHN DOES 1 THROUGH 25, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
Case No. 920228-CA 
Priority No. 16 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background Information 
Norman Anderson created a trust in 1978, naming his 
wife, Anna Lee, as beneficiary. He appointed his only child, 
James, to serve as trustee. R.152. Norman died in 1979, and 
James Anderson assumed his duties as trustee of the Norman 
Anderson Trust. R.152. 
The Trust assets consisted almost exclusively of shares 
of stock held in a brokerage account in the Salt Lake City branch 
office of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. R.147. In May, 1980, the 
stock was distributed from the Trust's account, some going into 
James' personal account with Dean Witter and some going into his 
mother's personal account there, too. R.147, Exhibit A; 152-154. 
Ralph Pahnke was the Dean Witter account executive for the 
transaction. R.147. 
iv 
Claims of the Parties 
On December 6, 1990, Anna Lee Anderson filed an action 
against Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke in the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah. R.la. She brought 
the action as beneficiary of the Trust. She contended the 
distribution of the stock violated the allocation scheme set 
forth in the Trust instrument. She demanded money damages. 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke filed a motion to dismiss 
her complaint on April 15, 1991. R.40. They claimed actions to 
recover trust assets must be brought by the trustee, not by the 
beneficiary. Accordingly, Anna Lee lacked standing and the 
trustee was an indispensable party. On July 16, 19 91, the 
district court granted the motion, dismissing Anna Lee's 
complaint. R.91. 
On July 22, 1991, before the district court had entered 
the order of dismissal, an amended complaint was filed. R.92. 
Anna Lee was replaced as the named-plaintiff by David M. Dudley, 
successor trustee. R.92, 154. 
The district court signed an Order on September 16, 
1991, dismissing Anna Lee's complaint. R.214-216. On October 9, 
1991, Anna Lee filed a notice of appeal. R.224-225. Mr. Dudley 
did not appeal. 
Disposition in the Court of Appeals 
On November 13, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals issued 
an opinion, reversing and remanding. It held Anna Lee Anderson 
v 
had standing to bring this action, as beneficiary, to collect 
trust assets and that she could pursue this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Anna Lee Anderson brought this action, as beneficiary, 
to recover assets owned by the Trust. Dean Witter and Ralph 
Pahnke contended Anna Lee could not bring the action absent 
allegations the trustee had failed to bring it after demand or 
that the trustee's self-interest put him in a position adverse to 
hers. Anna Lee failed to make these allegations and the district 
court dismissed the action. 
Immediately following dismissal Anna Lee voluntarily 
withdrew as plaintiff in favor of the trustee. She then 
appealed. Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke contended Anna Lee was no 
longer a party and could not appeal. 
The Court of Appeals determined both thai; Anna Lee 
could bring her action and file this appeal. Dean Witter and 
Ralph Pahnke petition the Court to reconsider its opinion. The 
Court's holding ignores applicable legal authority and adopts 
unworkable rules of law on issues of appellate jurisdiction and 
the authority of a beneficiary to assert trust claims. 
I. ANNA LEE IS NO LONGER A PARTY TO THIS ACTION AND SHE CANNOT 
APPEAL 
Anna Lee Anderson filed this action and Later withdrew 
as plaintiff. She allowed another to be substituted as named 
plaintiff. Anna Lee was no longer a party to the action 
following substitution, and lost all right to bring this appeal. 
1 
A. Anna Lee Anderson Substituted David M. Dudley As The Sole 
Plaintiff 
Anna Lee Anderson was the plaintiff on the original 
complaint. Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke moved to dismiss her 
complaint; their motion was granted. Before the order of 
dismissal was signed and entered, Anna Lee voluntarily withdrew 
as a party to the action and allowed the trustee, David M. 
Dudley, to be substituted as plaintiff. Mr. Dudley filed and 
served the First Amended Complaint, identical to the original 
complaint but for references to himself as the new party 
plaintiff. 
The amended complaint was sufficient in and of itself 
to substitute Mr. Dudley as plaintiff.1 Rule 15 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure permits free amendment of a complaint if 
done before a responsive pleading is filed. The only pleading 
filed by Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke was a motion to dismiss 
under Rule 12(b)(6). It was not a responsive pleading. Heritage 
Bank & Trust v. Landon, 770 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
("A motion to dismiss . . . is not a responsive pleading which 
would preclude an opponent from amending a complaint under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 15(a) *once as a matter of course.'") 
The amended complaint effectively changed plaintiffs. 
Anna Lee was no longer a party; she had been replaced by Mr. 
Dudley. Roberts v. Husky Industries, Inc.. 71 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. 
1
 Anna Lee's motion to amend the complaint, filed six days 
after the filing of the amended complaint, was superfluous. 
2 
Tenn. 1973) (facing a motion to dismiss, plaintiff amended the 
complaint, before a responsive pleading was filed, to substitute 
new plaintiffs); Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co. , 359 I'.2d 292, 296 
(2d Cir. 1966) ("Rule 15(a) may be used to substitute new 
plaintiffs."); Rosier v. Garron, Inc., 199 S.E.2d 50, 55 (W. Va. 
1973) ("[T]he federal courts . . . have uniformly held that under 
proper circumstances, a motion to substitute a party with 
property capacity to sue is appropriate under Rule 15."); 6 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1474 at 549-52 
(2d ed. 1990) ("[A] party may make a Rule 15(a) amendment to add, 
substitute, or drop parties to the action." (footnotes omitted; 
emphasis added.)) 
B. The Trustee Did Not Appeal 
David M. Dudley was the only plaintiff remaining after 
substitution. Mr. Dudley is not named in the notice of appeal, 
however, and he is barred from pursuing this appeal. Torres v. 
Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988) ("The failure to name 
a party in a notice of appeal is more than excusable 
xinformality'; it constitutes a failure of that party to 
appeal."); Magicsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123, 
125 (7th Cir. 1991); Rule 3(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Practice ("The notice of appeal shall specify the party or 
parties taking the appeal . . . . " ) . 
3 
C. The Court of Appeals Incorrectly Concluded Anna Lee Anderson 
Has Standing to Appeal 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke advised the Court of the 
jurisdictional problem posed by Mr. Dudley's substitution and 
Anna Lee's notice of appeal. See Brief of Respondents at 8-10. 
It was the subject of considerable discussion during oral 
argument. Nevertheless, the issue was relegated to a footnote in 
the opinion, and what analysis there is, ignores relevant facts 
and applicable case authority. The Court incorrectly disposed of 
the issue. 
The Court first mischaracterizes the effect of Anna 
Lee's filing of the amended complaint by saying she "attempted to 
file a document labeled Amended Complaint . . . ," and that 
" . . . it was in substance an attempt to substitute a party 
plaintiff." Opinion, fn. 1 at 2. (emphasis added). It was not 
an attempt. The First Amended Complaint was filed with the 
district court. Substitution of parties was an accomplished 
fact. 
Anna Lee herself acknowledged substitution had been 
achieved. In a pleading filed with the district court she 
admitted: 
. . . Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint in this 
matter. The Amended Complaint substitutes David M. 
Dudley as Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust as the 
Plaintiff therein. 
R.178. She repeated the admission in a subsequent pleading 
before the district court. R.205-206. And, she admitted to this 
4 
Court in her opening appeal brief that she had "filed an Amended 
Complaint naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust as plaintiff . . . ." Brief of Appellant, J 4 at 12. 
The First Amended Complaint was filed. Rule 15(a), 
U.R.C.P.; Heritage Bank & Trust v. Landon, supra. The amended 
complaint substituted plaintiffs. Roberts v. Husky, supra; 
Staggers v. Otto Gerdau. supra; Rosier v. Garron, Inc., supra; 
Wright & Miller, supra. Anna Lee ceased to be a party. She lost 
all right to appeal. 
Second, the Court explained the resolution of the 
jurisdictional issue depends on the amended complaint and, 
because it was reversing the dismissal of the original complaint 
and remanding, the Court would not reach any assignment of error 
based on the amended complaint. That the Court cannot do. The 
Court has the power and the duty to address every jurisdictional 
issue. It has recognized that "[t]he fundamental and initial 
inquiry of a court is always to determine its own jurisdictional 
authority. . . . " Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). That is true even to the point of the Court 
itself raising its own lack of jurisdiction. Coray v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 184 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah 1947). 
Third, the Court held that, in any event, Anna Lee had 
appealed the dismissal of the original complaint, which was 
itself a final order. The "finality" of the first dismissal 
order is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue raised here, 
5 
however.2 The only appropriate question is, "Who can take the 
appeal of an otherwise final order?" Certainly not strangers to 
the action, or those who at the time of appeal are no longer 
parties. Anna Lee, by her own admission, was no longer a party. 
She could not appeal. 
D. A Non-Party Cannot Appeal 
Only parties to a lawsuit may appeal. An illustrative 
case is Macricsilk Corp. of New Jersey v. Vinson, 924 F.2d 123 
(7th Cir. 1991). Magicsilk was the original named plaintiff. 
Vader Group, the purchaser of Magicsilk7s assets, filed a motion 
to be substituted as plaintiff. The motion was granted. 
Vader subsequently refused to cooperate in discovery in 
open defiance of a court order. The trial court dismissed the 
action with prejudice as a result. A notice of appeal was filed 
in the name of Magicsilk. Id. at 125. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noticed the 
problem created by the substitution of Vader as plaintiff and the 
notice of appeal filed by Magicsilk. Accordingly, the court 
itself raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction which had been 
neglected by the parties during briefing. Id. at 124. It 
dismissed the appeal, observing: 
2
 The first dismissal order would have been final for appeal 
had Anna Lee not elected to amend the complaint. Having done 
that, the order was at best interlocutory for purposes of appeal 
because the controversy between the litigants had not ended. 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton. 600 P.2d 538, 539 (Utah 1979). 
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This Court lacks jurisdiction over Magicsilk's appeal. 
Only parties to a lawsuit may appeal an adverse 
judgment. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S. 301, 304, 108 
S.Ct. 586, 587, 98 L.Ed.2d 629 (per curiam); Bense v. 
Starling, 719 F.2d 241, 244 (7th Cir. 19&3). Magicsilk 
Corp. of New Jersey, the only company lis;ted on the 
notice of appeal, has not been a party to this suit 
since the district court granted Vader's motion to 
substitute. 
Id. at 125. 
During oral argument in this appeal on October 20, 
1992, Judge Norman H. Jackson asked Reid Lewis, counsel for Dean 
Witter and Ralph Pahnke, whether Anna Lee somehow retained a 
right to appeal, following substitution, because her name still 
appeared on some pleadings, specifically the order which had 
dismissed Mr. Dudley's amended complaint. Mr. Lewis said no. 
The inadvertent use of one's name in a pleading caption is a 
clerical error, one which does not restore her presence in the 
action. That issue arose in Magicsilk, too. FollDwing the 
substitution of Vader, the parties acted to some extent as though 
substitution had not occurred. For example, Vader and the 
defendants still referred to the plaintiff as Magicsilk. Trial 
court documents listed Magicsilk as plaintiff, too. Id. at 124. 
And, the judgment eventually entered was directed against 
Magicsilk, not Vader. Id. at 125. These errors — clerical 
oversights as they were — did not breathe life into Magicsilk. 
It simply ceased to be a party following substitution. 
Another illustrative case is Appeal of E'istrict of 
Columbia Nurses7 Ass'n., 854 F.2d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In that 
7 
case several individual nurses and their professional 
association, District of Columbia Nurses' Association ("DCNA"), 
brought an action challenging the failure of the District of 
Columbia to pay appropriate overtime pay under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. The District of Columbia contended DCNA lacked 
standing under the Act and in response, plaintiffs moved to amend 
their complaint to remove DCNA as a party. Their motion was 
granted. In spite of withdrawal, DCNA's name continued to appear 
in the caption. 
Some time later, the Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the District of Columbia and against the individual 
nurses. A notice of appeal was filed in the name of DCNA. That 
prompted the Court of Appeals to make an inquiry: 
This court entered an order to show cause why the 
appeal should not be dismissed since the purported 
appellant was no longer a plaintiff at the time of the 
judgment and no remaining plaintiff had been identified 
as an appellant. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 
U.S. , 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 
(1988) (court of appeals only has jurisdiction over 
appeals of parties identified in notice of appeal); 
United States v. LTV Corp., 746 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (only party to district court action may note an 
appeal). 
Id. at 1449. The Court ultimately dismissed the appeal. It 
noted the general rule "that an appellant must be a party to the 
proceedings in order to file an appeal." Id. at 1449. DCNA had 
voluntarily removed itself from the action and no longer 
considered itself a party. Id. at 1449. The Court held: 
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This appeal was noted by a former plaintiff that had 
become a stranger to the litigation. No remaining 
plaintiff noted an appeal . . . . 
Id. at 1451. Cf., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 945 F.2d 1188 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991). 
II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THE TRUSTEE IMPROPERLY NEGLECTED TO 
BRING THIS ACTION 
The Court held Anna Lee may bring her action since the 
trustee "improperly neglected" to bring it. The Court finds 
neglect solely from the absence of the trustee's name in the 
caption. The Court's definition of neglect is indefensible. It 
would completely emasculate the general rule giving trustees 
exclusive right to maintain trust actions. 
The Court's error is highlighted by the recent, 
well-reasoned opinion of Firestone v. Galbreath, 976 F.2d 279 
(6th Cir. 1992). Beneficiaries of a trust sued a trustee and 
third parties on several tort claims. The trial court dismissed 
the action, ruling the beneficiaries lacked standing to pursue 
trust claims against third parties. The beneficiaries were 
unable, even though given an opportunity to amend their 
complaint, to allege facts (i.e., prior demand on the trustee to 
sue) necessary to overcome the general rule precluding them from 
pursuing trust claims. 
In affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals first reiterated that "generally only the 
trustee may bring an action on behalf of a trust," but went on to 
note that "the law makes an exception where the trustee has 
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refused or neglected to bring a demanded action." Id. at 284. 
The court rejected the beneficiaries' argument that the trustee's 
"improper neglect" was evidenced by the trustee's failure to 
bring suit: "This argument is a transparent exercise in 
semantics by the plaintiffs. Both terms, ^refuse' and ^neglect,' 
presuppose a demand, which the trustee either will not or forgets 
to bring." Id. Without allegations of demand made to the 
trustee to bring suit for the trust, the beneficiaries lacked 
standing to pursue the action. 
Firestone correctly interpreted "neglect" and this 
Court departed from it. If a trustee's improper neglect is shown 
merely by his failure to sue, the general rule giving trustees 
the exclusive right to bring trust claims is swallowed by the 
exception. Indeed, under that definition, whenever a beneficiary 
sues a third party for a trust claim, it will always mean the 
trustee "neglected" to sue. The interpretation is wrong. A 
trustee's neglect to bring an action can only be established by 
allegations of demand that suit be brought, followed by the 
trustee's failure to act on that demand. 
It must be emphasized that the only inference drawn by 
the Court of the trustee's neglect was his failure to bring this 
suit. There are no allegations demand was made and refused or 
ignored.3 Absent those allegations, the Court is unable to find 
3
 The record makes clear that far from ignoring or refusing 
to act, Anna Lee's son, James, as trustee, brought suit on other 
trust claims in 1987 against these same defendants. R. 53. 
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Anna Lee comes within the exception created by her trustee's 
improper neglect or refusal to bring the action. Anna Lee lacks 
standing. 
The sole authority cited by the Court for its 
interpretation of "neglect" is Struble v. New Jerseiy Brewery 
Employees7 Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Struble does not define "neglect." It does address, however, a 
beneficiary's right to sue upon the trustee's failure to do so. 
Rather than accepting this Court's overly broad approach — 
allowing a beneficiary to sue whenever the trustee does not — 
Struble requires the beneficiary to affirmatively allege a breach 
of trust by the trustee. 
III. THERE IS NO RECORD EVIDENCE OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN ANNA LEE 
ANDERSON AND THE TRUSTEE 
The Court correctly notes a beneficiary has standing to 
pursue a trust claim against a third party if the interests of 
the trustee are hostile to the beneficiary. The Court suggests, 
however, there is an indication of hostility between Anna Lee as 
beneficiary and her son, James, as original trustee. 
The Court does not cite any evidence of hostility. Nor 
does it draw from the allegations in the complaint any inference 
of hostility between them. Nor could the Court. The most that 
can be said of the complaint is it alleges stock held by the 
Trust was transferred to James by Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke. 
There is no allegation the trustee ever knew about the transfer, 
let alone that it was improper. There is no allegation he 
participated in the transfer, nor that he intended it to occur. 
11 
In fact, the only reasonable inference to draw from the face of 
the complaint is that the trustee did not know anything was 
wrong. 
The complaint goes to extraordinary lengths to insulate 
the trustee. The entire blame for the transfer is laid at the 
feet of Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke.4 How could the trustee's 
interests be hostile to the beneficiary's when they were both 
allegedly duped? 
IV. THE ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED FOR ANNA LEE ANDERSON'S 
FAILURE TO JOIN THE TRUSTEE AS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY 
Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke contended Anna Lee's 
complaint must be dismissed for two reasons: First, she, as 
beneficiary, cannot pursue an action to collect trust assets held 
by third parties; the action belongs to the trustee. Second, she 
must join the trustee, therefore, as an indispensable party. The 
Court held Anna Lee had standing to bring an action as 
beneficiary, noting that its decision made it unnecessary to 
address the issue of indispensable parties. The Court's 
assumption — that standing and indispensable parties are 
mutually exclusive — is not correct. 
The Court must address the issue of indispensable 
parties even though it held Anna Lee has standing. Although it 
is possible a beneficiary can bring an action against a third 
party, the trustee must be joined if he can be subjected to the 
Anna Lee blames Dean Witter and Ralph Pahnke, stock 
brokers, for allowing her son, James, to administer and act on 
behalf of the Trust. She holds them to a higher standard than 
she does the trustee. 
12 
jurisdiction of the court. 4 A. Scott and W. Fratcher, The Law 
of Trusts § 282.1, at 30-31 (4th Ed. 1989); Restatement of Trusts 
(Second) § 282 cmt e (1959). 
Even one of the cases cited by the Court in its 
opinion, Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust 
Fund, supra, at 336-337, recognizes the rule. So does Cherry v. 
Howell, 66 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1933). The court held the trustee 
must be joined when the beneficiary sues a third party for taking 
part in a breach of trust. Id. at 716. (citation omitted). In 
Cherry, two shareholders of a corporation brought an action 
against two directors. Id. at 714. The shareholders alleged 
misappropriation of trust funds by the trustee, with the 
directors7 participation. Id. at 716. The court :.ield that when 
a beneficiary sues to have a trust fund restored, the trustee 
must be joined. Id. Similarly, Anna Lee, as a beneficiary, 
could not bring this action without joining the trustee. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. It was commenced by someone, Anna Lee, who is no 
longer a party to the action. 
The Court should affirm the district court's dismissal 
of Anna Lee's complaint. She has failed to make allegations 
sufficient to establish her standing as a proper party plaintiff. 
On the face of the complaint, only the trustee could have brought 
the action. 
13 
CERTIFICATION 
I, Reid E. Lewis, counsel for Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. and Ralph Pahnke, hereby certify that the Petition for 
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Attorneys for Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. and 
Ralph Pahnke 
Defendants and Appellees 
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